Economic Theories of Bundling and their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Mircrosoft Case by Kuhn, Kai-Uwe
Law & Economics Working Papers
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive:
2003-2009
University of Michigan Law School Year 2004
Economic Theories of Bundling and their
Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An
Assessment in Light of the Mircrosoft
Case
Kai-Uwe Kuhn
University of Michigan Law School, kukuhn@umich.edu
This paper is posted at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law econ archive/art33
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
 
 
 
JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMICS 
 
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BUNDLING 
AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN  
ABUSE CASES: AN ASSESSMENT IN 
LIGHT OF THE MICROSOFT CASE 
 
KAI-UWE KÜHN, ROBERT STILLMAN AND  
CRISTINA CAFFARRA 
 
PAPER #04-019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAPER CAN BE DOWNLOADED WITHOUT CHARGE AT: 
 
MICHIGAN JOHN M. OLIN WEBSITE 
HTTP://WWW.LAW.UMICH.EDU/CENTERSANDPROGRAMS/OLIN/PAPERS.HTM  
  
 
1
Kuhn:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
 Economic Theories of Bundling 
 and their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases:   
An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case 
Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan), Robert Stillman (Lexecon Ltd., London),  
and Cristina Caffarra (Lexecon Ltd., London)1 
                                                     
1
 The authors advised the CCIA (Computer and Communications Industry Association) in their intervention 
against Microsoft on the bundling of Windows Media Player with Windows in the context of the recent European 
Commission investigation. The paper is based in part on this work. The authors have also advised Sun 
Microsystems in their European complaint against Microsoft on exclusionary practices in the market for 
workgroup servers. Kühn advised Honeywell in its appeal against the GE/Honeywell decision, Caffarra advised 
GE in GE/Honeywell, and Stillman advised the merging parties in Tetra Laval/Sidel. All opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and not attributable to any of the mentioned companies.  
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1 Introduction and Overview 
Theories of bundling have gained enormous prominence in European competition policy in a number of 
recent cases, concerning both merger control and abuse of dominance. Prominent examples include 
GE/Honeywell, Tetra Laval/Sidel and the recent Microsoft decision in which the European Commission 
ordered the unbundling of the Windows Media Player from Windows. The Commission has been 
heavily criticized, especially in the US, for its treatment of bundling in these cases. Indeed, in the US 
there is an important current of opinion that advocates a “laissez faire” approach to bundling practices. 
Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla (2003) have recently summarized the arguments of this school of thought.2 
They suggest a (modified) “per se legality” rule for bundling on the basis that the efficiency effects of 
bundling are ubiquitous, while the anti-competitive effects highly non-robust.3 
In this paper we show that the “laissez faire” approach to bundling cannot be based on the current state 
of the economic literature. Like most economists, we are hesitant about very restrictive policies against 
bundling. One reason is that they may interfere with product design decisions of firms, which may 
hamper product innovation.  But such a cautious approach to policies towards bundling does not imply 
that intervention is never appropriate.  We show in this paper that there are identifiable circumstances in 
which bundling can lead to anticompetitive effects and in which intervention against bundling can be 
justified as a legitimate remedy.  This does not mean that the general hard-line position the European 
Commission has taken against bundling can be justified. The relevant theories identify a very limited 
set of characteristics and very specific evidence that can support a conclusion of anticompetitive 
bundling. The most important criticism in cases like Tetra Laval/Sidel and GE/Honeywell has been that 
the specific anticompetitive mechanism was never clearly identified, and therefore there was no clear 
set of evidence that could have led to the conclusion that bundling was anticompetitive.4 The 
Commission’s arguments on bundling in the “media player” portion of the Microsoft case stand on 
much more solid foundations. They rely on specific theories and well-understood anticompetitive 
mechanisms. Furthermore the evidence put forward by the Commission in the “media player” case is 
unquestionably relevant to the anticompetitive mechanisms identified 5 
In this paper we attempt to sketch how a systematic approach to bundling cases can be structured. For 
that purpose we first provide an overview of existing bundling theories, concentrating on the key 
economic mechanisms (Section 2). After an exposition of the state of the theory on bundling and its 
empirical implications, we critique the interpretations made of this body of literature by supporters of a 
“laissez faire” approach to bundling. These include the incorrect attribution of efficiencies to bundling, 
misinterpretations on the robustness of the relevant theory, as well as errors in the theory of policy 
                                                     
2
 Ahlborn, C., D. Evans and J. Padilla (2003), The Antitrust Economics of Bundling: A Farewell to Per Se 
Illegality,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 03-3 (February). 
3
  See also, among others, Evans, D., Padilla, J.A. and Polo, M., “Tying in Platform Software: Reasons for a Rule 
of Reason Standard in European Competition Law”, 25 World Competition 509, (2002).  
The arguments about the competitive effects of bundling are the same whether Art 82 or merger cases are 
involved. The only complication in mergers cases is that competition authorities have to make predictions about a 
change in bundling practices due to a merger. See Kühn (2002) for a critique of using bundling arguments in 
merger cases.  
5
 This statement does is not an assessment of the strength of the evidence in the media player case. Our 
involvement in this case was limited to assessing the literature and the relevant empirical criteria for implementing 
anti-bundling remedies.  
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(Section 3). We attempt to overcome these shortcomings by developing a number of criteria to identify 
potentially anticompetitive bundling, based on the more robust features of the theory. Section 4 puts 
forward a set of rules to guide competition authorities in determining when intervention against 
bundling is justifiable as a matter of economics.  Section 5 concludes. 
The policy rules outlined in this paper involve three elements:  
1. A “safe haven” rule that specifies circumstances under which bundling should never be 
challenged;  
2. For cases that do not fall within the “safe haven”, a decision rule that determines when 
bundling is likely to have anticompetitive effects;  
3. A rule for evaluating potential offsetting efficiency benefits from bundling.   
Our “safe haven” rule specifies that intervention against bundling should never be considered unless all 
three of the following conditions are met: (a) the firm in question has monopoly power (i.e. at least a 
dominant position), in one market which is affected by bundling; (b) the bundled goods are 
complements; and (c) there is significant (and costly to overcome) asymmetry in the product lines of the 
dominant firm and its rivals. 
The decision rule that determines whether anticompetitive effects are likely cannot be based on a set of 
pre-determined market characteristics. The reason is that there are many theories capable of yielding 
anticompetitive effects from bundling, and there may well be other valid theories that have not yet been 
formally articulated. A rigorous approach to the competition assessment of bundling will require that in 
each specific case, a plausible theory of how bundling can have anticompetitive effects in the market in 
question is formulated. Furthermore, evidence needs to be presented to show that the mechanism 
described by the theory has relevance in the markets in question.6  
Generally, there are a number of mechanisms through which bundling can plausibly lead to 
anticompetitive effects. However, we explain that intervention against bundling is most justified when 
the evidence suggests that the motivation for the bundling is to affect the intensity of competition in the 
future. As discussed below, industries in which network effects are important seem especially 
conducive to such bundling.  This in turn suggests that competition authorities should pay special 
attention to the competitive effects of bundling for instance in industries such as software, where 
network effects are unquestionably important.   
Finally, it is necessary to take account of possible efficiency benefits of bundling practices. However 
there are good reasons for placing the burden of proof for demonstrating material efficiencies on the 
bundling firm.  Efficiency defences should not be accepted if bundling does not appear necessary for 
realising the efficiencies claimed. Many plausible-sounding efficiency claims do not pass such a test. 
We also point out the important distinction between the ex ante benefits of designing a bundled product 
offering, and the ex post cost of unbundling. We argue that only the ex ante benefits of designing a 
bundled product should matter in the assessment of efficiency effects. Allowing a dominant firm to 
                                                     
6
 In the Tetra Laval/Sidel and GE/Honeywell cases the European Commission failed to make a case against 
bundling on the basis of this criterion. 
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continue with a bundling strategy simply because the ex post costs of unbundling are high would be 
highly undesirable, as it would encourage irreversible anticompetitive bundling.    
In summary, we provide a systematic economic framework for marshalling arguments and evidence for 
an effective evaluation of bundling practices.  Our framework does not advance any radical new ideas, 
but rather illustrates how a sensible approach can be developed from the established economic literature 
that will, in specific circumstances, justify intervention against bundling practices.     
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2 The economics of bundling 
The term “bundling” is used for a variety of pricing and product design practices that involve, in some 
form, offering different goods together as a package. Economists speak of “pure bundling” or “tying” 
when two different goods are offered only together at a package price.7 A special form of pure bundling 
arises when the two products are linked technically such that it is physically impossible for the 
consumer to separate them. This form of pure bundling is called “technical bundling” and involves 
some form of lasting product design decision. Pure bundling is distinguished from “mixed bundling” 
where a firm offers the products together at a bundle price but also offers the component products 
individually at stand-alone prices. An equivalent form of mixed bundling occurs when a firm quotes 
stand-alone prices but gives a discount for buying both products.  
Technical bundling (and to a lesser degree mixed bundling) is widely observed in real world markets: 
Shoes are sold in pairs, cars come with motors, and so on. Such examples are used by some economists 
to ridicule the historical per-se prohibitions of bundling practices in the US.  However, they are not 
relevant for the issue of bundling in the context of competition policy. For example, even  the historical 
“per se” prohibition of tying in the US would not have  required unbundling a motor from the rest of a 
car. Bundling has only been an issue for competition policy when one firm has strong market power or 
a monopoly on at least one component part of the bundle. Only then do concerns about the competitive 
effects of bundling or tying ever arise. Even a per-se prohibition would therefore only cover bundling 
by a firm with considerable market power for one of the components in a (potential) bundle.  
But the established economic knowledge narrows the scope for a debate even further. The economic 
literature has clearly established both efficiency reasons and anticompetitive reasons for bundling.  The 
real debate is not about whether bundling can have anticompetitive effects. The real debate is about 
identifying the circumstances under which anticompetitive effects of bundling are likely to occur and 
what criteria should be used to come to the conclusion that an unbundling remedy is justified).  
Exponents of the “laissez faire” approach to bundling have argued that the literature provides little 
guidance for identifying anticompetitive bundling in practice, and that efficiencies are so 
overwhelmingly important that intervention is never justified. We will show that this conclusion cannot 
be drawn from the existing body of literature. The existing theories give clear guidance as to the 
relevant evidence in specific cases. This section reviews this economic literature on bundling theories 
as a necessary foundation for identifying the circumstances under which bundling is likely to have 
anticompetitive effects.     
2.1 Theories of anticompetitive bundling 
A common way to think about the decisions of firms in markets is to distinguish between “short-run 
profit maximizing” and “long-run profit maximizing” behaviour.  For the purposes of our analysis, the 
important distinction is that short-run profit maximizing firms take the anticipated decisions of 
competitors as given and are therefore not aimed at influencing actions of competitors. Long-run profit 
maximizing firms in contrast recognize that current actions can influence, for example, investment 
                                                     
7
 For purposes of exposition we find it clearer to use the term “pure bundling” used in the economics literature 
instead of the term “tying” that is more frequently used in the anti-trust literature. 
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decisions of competitors. If a firm aims at influencing the future competitive interaction in the market, it 
will typically not maximise short-run profits. Leveraging and foreclosure are examples of phenomena 
that arise because firms recognize the impact of current actions on the future competitiveness of the 
market.8  
Bundling has the potential to be anticompetitive whether it is part of a strategy to maximize short-run 
profits or whether it is part of a strategy that sacrifices profits in the short run in return for larger profits 
in the long run via the effect of bundling on future competitive conditions.  We will discuss 
anticompetitive theories of bundling based on short-term profit maximization first and then review the 
theories based on long-run profit maximization.  We will show that robust conclusion mainly arise from 
the second set of theories.  
2.1.1 The competitive effects of bundling to maximize profits in the short run 
2.1.1.1 Bundling as price discrimination 
The incentives for bundling under short run profit maximization arise purely for reasons of price 
discrimination. There is an ample literature (e.g. McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989), Salinger 
(1995)) that describes these incentives for a monopolist selling two goods. These papers show that 
bundling is a means by which the monopolist can realise more revenue than if the two products were 
sold separately.     
With both pure and mixed bundling, sellers can extract more revenue from customers with strong 
preferences for just one of the goods in the bundle than if the products in the bundle were all sold 
separately. This becomes particularly clear with mixed bundling. To see this, note that the seller can fix 
the bundle price at the sum of the pre-bundling stand-alone prices. Now consider a slight increase in the 
price for one of the products. Customers who bought both products before are not affected by this move 
because they will now simply buy the bundle. But customers who before purchased only this 
component now have two options to react to such a price increase. They can either stop buying or they 
can purchase the bundle. For some consumers purchasing the bundle will be preferable because this 
yields the second product as an added benefit. However, had the bundled option not been available, 
these consumers would just have stopped buying the product. Hence, a seller loses relatively less 
customers from increasing stand-alone prices when he also offers a bundle of the two products. The 
seller can thus extract greater profits from buyers with extreme single product preferences but limit the 
loss in sales to buyers with more intermediate preferences. In addition, he will also extract greater 
benefits from customers who switch from purchasing just one product to purchasing both products. 
Pure bundling effectively only relies on the latter effect, because in pure bundling there are no stand-
alone prices.9  
                                                     
8
 We are using the terms “short-run profit maximizing” and “long-run profit maximizing” simply as a means of 
organizing the discussion of different theories of bundling.  What we refer to here as short-run profit maximizing 
behaviour can also be described as “non-strategic behaviour”, and likewise what we describe as long-run profit 
maximizing behaviour can be described as “strategic behaviour”.  Whether we use one set of labels or another, the 
fundamental difference between alternative explanations of bundling is whether or not bundling is used to 
influence the future intensity of competition.     
9
 One can think of pure bundling as a special mixed bundling strategy in which the prices for the stand-alone 
product are set above the highest valuation of any customer. 
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However, bundling does not only allow the seller to extract more revenue from buyers with strong 
preferences for a single component. It also makes it profitable to lower the price for buyers with 
intermediate preferences by offering the bundle at a lower price than the sum of the stand-alone prices 
that would have been charged without bundling. To explain why, consider the situation of a monopolist 
selling two components, A and B.  If the multi-product firm lowered stand-alone prices (but did not 
bundle), more customers would purchase A and B and there would be more customers buying both A 
and B.  But, if the initial stand-alone prices of A and B were profit-maximizing, then the profit from 
these added sales must be outweighed by the reduction in revenues from the across-the-board decrease 
in prices.   
Mixed bundling allows the multi-product monopolist to solve this problem.  Mixed bundling allows the 
multi-product monopolist to avoid giving “unnecessary” price cuts to customers with extreme 
preferences.  If the monopolist offers lower prices only if a customer buys both products, customers 
with extreme preferences (e.g. high valuation on A and low valuation on B) will find it preferable to 
continue purchasing only this one product (A) at the stand-alone prices.  Thus, by using mixed 
bundling, the multi-product monopolist can increase revenues by, in effect, offering targeted discounts 
to customers with intermediate preferences (inducing more of them to purchase both products) without 
losing revenues by “unnecessarily” cutting prices to customers with extreme preferences.  
Note that in welfare terms there is a trade-off between two groups of consumers: buyers with extreme 
valuations suffer from higher prices, while those with intermediate valuations benefit from lower prices. 
As in all of the price discrimination literature, there is an ambiguous in welfare effect. Practically, it is 
impossible to predict the welfare effects of such bundling. 
It should be noted that bundling brings no advantages under monopoly when the bundled components 
are perfect complements for all consumers10. In this case there are no consumers who would wish to 
take the stand-alone product and the incentive for bundling, namely the discrimination between  
customers with strong willingness to pay for only one of the two products, and consumers for whom the 
valuations of the two products are similar disappears. 
2.1.1.2 Bundling in the presence of competition 
The incentives for bundling are not fundamentally different when there is competition between a multi-
product firm and other firms that offer the same range of components. However, one has to take some 
care in interpreting the model. Given the prices firm A expects its rivals to set, the distribution of buyer 
preferences over all possible combinations of the products induces a distribution of reservation prices 
for customers over the goods supplied by firm A. Again, firm A’s bundling strategy will be driven by 
the incentive to extract greater revenue from buyers that have high valuations for only one component. 
For example, a buyer that has a strong preference for one component from one firm, but a strong 
preference for the other component from its rival, would have extreme preferences in this setting. By 
bundling, more revenue can be extracted from the customers with strong willingness to pay for only one 
of the firm’s products. 
                                                     
10
 Products are “complements” when an increase in the price of one decreases the demand for the other.  Products 
are “perfect complements” when they are used in fixed proportions.   The case of perfect complements to all 
consumers is the special case in which the so-called “one monopoly profit” point holds – i.e., it is the special case 
in which a monopolist in one product has no incentive to monopolise the market for the complementary product.  
8
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However, it should be noted that there is an important difference from the monopoly case. Even if two 
components, A and B, are perfect complements, consumers might prefer component A from one firm 
and B from the other. Hence, there may be consumers who would be willing to pay a high price for just 
one of the components offered by the firm. Then the incentive to price discriminate remains, despite the 
perfect complementarity of the two components.  
It will still be the case that with bundling in the presence of competition there are incentives to lower 
the bundle prices below the component prices in the absence of bundling. In a setting where there is 
competition, this has a pro-competitive effect. Knowing that bundling leads to incentives to lower the 
bundle price, competitors will have an incentive to set lower prices when they anticipate a bundling 
pricing strategy (relative to the situation with linear pricing). This is a well-known phenomenon in the 
non-linear pricing literature. Discounting practices quite generally allow the firm to aim discounts at 
marginal customers, which will tend to increase price competition. When a competitor firm offers the 
same kind of product line the bundling opportunity has been shown to have the benefit of intensifying 
price competition (see Matutes and Regibeau (1992) for an example). 
Finally, it should be noted, however, that these bundling incentives rely on some product differentiation 
between the product line components of rivals. The more homogeneous the components are, the fiercer 
price competition becomes component by component and the benefits of a bundling strategy become 
minimal. In other words, real benefits to bundling only exist when a firm has sufficient market power to 
charge stand alone prices significantly above marginal cost. Such market power arises in the literature 
from product differentiation, but could equally be generated by capacity restrictions of rivals. 
2.1.1.3 Bundling of complements and the “Cournot effect” 
As shown by Nalebuff (2000), considerable price increasing effects from bundling can be generated 
when firms do not sell symmetric product lines of complementary components.  His argument is based 
on the so-called “Cournot effect” that arises because of a coordination problem in pricing on the part of 
the rival firms offering complementary products. 
The Cournot effect originally refers to the observation that a single monopolist of several complements 
would set a lower price than separate monopolists each selling one of the goods. The reason is that each 
individual firm ignores that a price cut would increase the demand for the complementary products of 
the other firms. This effect disappears when there is competition for each one of the complementary 
goods, such as the competition that would exist if the single-product firms faced competition from a 
multi-product firm that sold its products separately. Then Bertrand competition in the market for each 
of the individual products would drive prices to marginal cost and the Cournot effect would disappear.11 
Nalebuff (2000) shows that the Cournot effect re-appears and can be remarkably powerful if the multi-
product firm practices pure bundling. Suppose one firm can offer all complementary goods and faces 
competition for each component from one firm. First, consider a situation in which no bundling is 
                                                     
11
 In the real world, we would not expect literal marginal cost pricing. However, competition component by 
component would reduce margins so much that benefits from bundling would be minimal. In practice we would 
not expect to see bundling when its effects are small, since there are significant costs of devising a bundling 
strategy due to its complexity. The theoretical literature should therefore be interpreted as predicting that 
competition reduces bundling incentives sufficiently to make bundling unlikely. 
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allowed. Then there is price competition component by component and customers purchase each 
component from the firm that offer the best deal on that component.  
Now consider the case in which the firm with the full product line switches to a pure bundling strategy. 
Under these circumstances, a price cut by one of the single-product firms will make marginal customers 
switch from buying the bundle of the multi-product firm to buying the whole suite of components from 
the individual competing firms. The reason is that it cannot replace just one component anymore. 
Hence, part of the benefits of inducing consumers to switch is gained by other single-product firms. 
This means that the individual firms have less of an incentive to cut prices and win over demand from 
the bundling firm than if all competitors with complementary products would be producing as a single 
firm. The Cournot effect reappears as a result of the bundling because competition now takes place 
between the bundle and a combination of individually produced complements. Competition was 
effective without coordination because in the absence of bundling it took place component by 
component. With bundling, the coordination problem reappears and prevents an aggressive competitive 
response to the prices of the bundling firm.  
Indeed, there is an aspect to this effect that directly implies that there can be significant price increases 
as a result of the bundling strategy. For a given price cut one separate firm will not win over as many 
customers, because buyers with a strong preference for one or more of the other components offered by 
bundling firm would have to make a switch to a less preferred component to take advantage of this 
price cut. As a result, there is an anticompetitive effect insofar as the price-cutting incentives of the 
single-component firms are blunted by bundling of the multi-product firm. Bundling can therefore result 
in a significant reduction in price competition and hence a significant increase in all prices. 
Nalebuff (2000) has shown that with complementary products, this price increasing effect is more 
pronounced, the more items are bundled together, i.e. when there are appreciable asymmetries in the 
length of the product line between the bundling firm and its single-product rivals. This result is of 
particular interest to the Microsoft cases because software markets can involve the bundling of many 
complementary products. The impact of the Cournot effect is that single-component firms tend to 
concentrate in their pricing strategy on niche markets for customers with very strong single component 
preferences. As a result price competition for customers with intermediate preferences is eroded.  
Note that the anticompetitive effects that can arise from these asymmetries in product line length are not 
necessarily the result of an anticompetitive strategic intent by the bundling firm to influence the shape 
of future competition. The incentives to bundle arise from standard price discrimination incentives. 
Nevertheless, the impact of bundling can be anticompetitive when bundling is anticipated by the 
competitors.  To the extent that such bundling possibilities by a dominant firm with a much longer line 
of complementary products may lead to significantly higher prices, there may be a legitimate 
competition policy concern.   
2.1.2  Commitments to future bundling  
Economic analysis has established a number of ways in which bundling can lead to less intense 
competition in the market, whenever a firm can commit to a bundling policy in the future. This may be 
in a setting where there is commitment to a bundling pricing structure and prices are set in the future. 
But in some models there is even an assumption of commitment to given prices. These models come in 
10
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two flavours. One type points out the ‘product differentiation’ effects of commitments to bundles, while 
the other focuses on the potential ‘entry deterrence’ effects of bundling policies.12   
The difficulty with all of these models is that they assume a pre-commitment to specific bundling 
strategies. In practice, a review of the literature suggests that all examples of credible pre-commitment 
to a bundling strategy effectively involve a physical link between the products – in other words, some 
form of technical bundling. Contractual bundling would not achieve the desired effect because there is 
no guarantee that, at the time of price setting, the bundling configuration would not be changed as well.  
2.1.2.1 The ‘product differentiation’ argument 
The ‘product differentiation’ argument has been put forward in papers by Carbajo, de Meza and 
Seidman (1990), and Chen (1997). Both papers present essentially the same mechanism, although in 
slightly different settings. The basic idea can be gleaned from Carbajo et al. Suppose there was one 
producer of products A and B, and a competing producer of product B. And assume there was no 
product differentiation between the firms on product B. Suppose also that customers’ valuations of A 
and B are perfectly correlated (i.e. customers who have a high valuation for A also have a high 
valuation for B, and vice versa). If the first firm sells A and B separately, the price for B would be 
competed down to marginal cost.  However, if the first firm can commit to bundling A and B while the 
other sells B alone, the first firm will sell to high-valuation customers in equilibrium, while the second 
firm will sells to low-valuation customers. Competition is softened as in standard vertical product 
differentiation models (see Tirole 1988) and, in this case, the single-product producer of B will be able 
to charge a price greater than marginal cost to “its” segment of the market, i.e., the low valuation 
customers.  
What is typical for this class of models is that firms share customers by targeting those with different 
characteristics through the bundle design. This is in essence a variant of models in the (vertical) product 
differentiation literature. However, for these arguments to work there cannot be perfect 
complementarity between the components A and B. With perfect complementarity there would be no 
customers who would wish to buy the stand-alone product B. This literature is therefore less relevant to 
the evaluation of the competitive impact of bundling in markets with strong complementarities, such as 
the bundling of operating systems with applications.       
2.1.2.2 Entry deterrence arguments 
The seminal work on this issue is Whinston (1990). His main contribution is to demonstrate the 
theoretical possibility of leverage through bundling. Whinston’s model assumes away all price 
discrimination incentives for bundling. Bundling is a commitment to sell in the future only in a bundled 
form. As in bundling models with competition, this increases the intensity of competition with future 
rivals. This may make it unprofitable for future rivals to enter the market, so that bundling becomes an 
effective entry deterrence device.  
                                                     
12
 We use the term “entry deterrence” here as a shorthand both for the reduction of de novo entry into the industry, 
and the contraction in investments of firms already in the industry (whether this causes exit or not). Note that 
sometimes it is erroneously claimed that there is foreclosure only if exit occurs or entry is deterred. Such a claim 
would be wrong and is not implied by our use of the word “entry deterrence”. 
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Whinston’s work is not, however, a strong basis for antitrust policy. A claim that a firm is committing 
to ‘excessively competitive’ behaviour is problematic in an antitrust setting. In Whinston (1990) the 
bundling firm never prices below marginal cost. As a result, rivals with equal or lower marginal cost on 
one of the products are excluded only if they face high enough fixed costs of entry. If fixed costs do not 
deter entry, then the bundling strategy is pro-competitive and leads to lower prices for customers 
because entry into the tied good market occurs and the bundling firm by assumption carries through on 
its commitment to compete aggressively in the tied good market. It is therefore difficult to argue based 
on this theory that a firm is bundling for exclusionary reasons, since this would require proof that it 
knew that entry costs were above the relevant level. In addition, the theory gives little insight into the 
bundling of complementary products: under perfect complementarity the outcome is the same whether 
bundling occurs or not, and therefore the theory has little bite when applied to markets like those for 
software.  This is because, with perfect complementarity, the one-monopoly profit point holds. With 
perfect complementarity, the monopolist in one of the components can realise full monopoly profits 
through appropriate pricing of that single component and there is no gain from bundling.  
Nalebuff (1999) develops a variant of the Whinston model for perfectly complementary products that 
attempts to argue that even in this case there is more effective entry deterrence through bundling. In 
Nalebuff’s paper there is not only pre-commitment to bundling, but also to the actual bundled price. 
This is important in his model because it is assumed that the incumbent monopolist is uncertain whether 
the entrant will produce component A or B, but the incumbent is forced to set prices before this 
uncertainty is resolved. As a result, the incumbent sets relatively high prices in both markets with 
independent prices, in order to exploit the situation should he have a monopoly position in that market. 
Through this modelling device, Nalebuff generates the same result as Whinston: price competition is 
enhanced through the commitment to bundling. The entrant’s profits are greatly reduced and thus 
foreclosure is more likely for given fixed costs of entry.  Unfortunately, this result breaks down when 
pricing decisions can be made after the entrant’s product choice is revealed – as would be a more 
realistic assumption. Then price competition in the market in which entry occurs drives prices down to 
marginal cost, and bundling is irrelevant for entry deterrence. Nalebuff (1999) therefore appears to give 
little tangible support for competition policy intervention against bundling. 
A variant of the Whinston (1990) argument for perfect complements is also developed by Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001). Here the (partial) entry deterrence result is generated through a market share effect 
of future pure bundling. Anticipating that an incumbent will use pure bundling in the future, rival firms 
know that a cost reducing innovation on one component will never be sold with the other component of 
the bundling firm. However, in the absence of bundling, the cost reducing innovation would always be 
sold in equilibrium. As a result, the incentives for innovation are reduced in this model if an incumbent 
can commit to future bundling and competitors invest less in R+D.  Note, however, that this possibility 
of partial exclusion through the reduction of R+D does not necessarily generate the incentives to 
exclude for the incumbent. If a component is replaced by a better one of a rival, the profits for the 
incumbent may well go strictly up. The reason why the incumbent may want to limit R+D by others is 
that he wants to reduce the possibility that all of his components are replaced. As long as there is one 
component of the system that is expected to remain a monopoly component with high probability in the 
future, the model does not provide strong bundling incentives at all.  
Note also, that this theory heavily relies on commitment to future bundling before competitors invest in 
R+D. The reason is that there are no benefits of bundling once R+D results have been realised. The 
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incumbent can only lose in terms of profits by not having a better or cheaper complement pull his sales. 
This means that this theory is probably only of relevance for cases of technical bundling that is costly to 
reverse.  
Overall, models with commitment to bundling in the future to deter future entry appear to be too fragile 
to provide a firm foundation for competition policy intervention at the moment. Especially in markets 
with complements, these models give only limited support for intervention against bundling practices.  
2.1.3 Effect of current bundling on the future competitiveness of rivals 
A third class of mechanisms that can lead to anticompetitive effects from bundling relies on two 
elements. First, it requires that bundling shifts demand away from the competitor of the bundling firm. 
Secondly, it requires that this demand shift lead to the bundling firm facing less intense competition in 
the future. The key issue in establishing whether such theories are relevant to a particular product 
market is whether there are plausible mechanisms that can generate such a link from current market 
share to future advantage. 
2.1.3.1 Complementary products that facilitate future substitution 
The most important paper exploring future competition effects in the context of bundling is Carlton and 
Waldman (2000).13 They develop several models that are based on the same conceptual principle: 
complements to current products may develop into or facilitate the entry of substitute products of 
current or future products of the dominant incumbent firm. By reducing the market presence of the 
current complement by bundling a tying product with its own complement, the incumbent can prevent 
the emergence of serious competitive threats in the future.14  
There are several models of this flavour contained in Carlton and Waldman. We will here only discuss 
the first model, which relies on what is known as defensive leveraging. It has a similar trade-off as the 
Choi and Stefanadis model: while an incumbent monopolist benefits from a competitor developing a 
better component, he will try to avoid the replacement of the whole system. In their model a competitor 
can produce a single complement in period 1 developed by a competitor. If this complement is 
produced then in period two there is sufficient demand for an investment in the development of a 
competing primary product (allowing for system substitution). If the first period complement is not 
developed one can generate parameters for which no further investment takes place. By bundling in 
period 1 the incumbent can reduce the profitability of the development of the complement, which then 
would not b e developed. As a result, systems competition does not arise in period 2. This has some cost 
to the incumbent because the complement of the competitor would have enhanced the value of the 
market in period 1 to the incumbent.  
                                                     
13
 Bernheim and Whinston  (1998) have explored these issues earlier in the context of vertically related market 
where exclusive dealing in the vertical chain is analogous to bundling between complements. 
14
 This basic set of mechanism includes what is generally known as “defensive leveraging” as well as the “passing 
off monopoly positions” story, in which the the monopolist bundles in order “to ‘swing’ or transfer its monopoly 
to the newly emerging market in a setting in which the newly emerging market is associated with the same 
complementary good as the monopolist’s primary market”.  Carlton and Waldman (1998), page 212.  These 
monopoly-extension models rely on essentially the same mechanisms as the defensive leveraging models and we 
therefore do not discuss them separately in this paper.  
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This model depends on a delicate interlinkage of investment incentives that will be of relevance only 
for specific parameter settings. This therefore seems to be a weak intertemporal link supporting 
potential foreclosure because the conclusion depends on data that is realistically not verifiable. The 
other models in Carlton and Waldman are similar in spirit in the sense that the development of a first 
period complementary good makes investment into a second period good profitable that would compete 
with some current or future product of the incumbent.  
While the insight of Carlton and Waldman that strong foreclosure incentives can be generated when 
current complementarity generates future substitutability, theories based on such ideas do not have to 
rely on assumptions that are as fragile as the assumptions of their models. Indeed, complete exit of the 
potential competitor or commitment to bundling in the future are all elements that can be dispensed 
with in some versions of these theories. The dependence of the Carlton and Waldman arguments on 
delicate interrelationships between demand parameters and investment costs is not a characteristic of all 
possible models of intertemporal linkages between current bundling and future competition. We discuss 
a more powerful version of their argument based on Kühn (2001) in the next section. 
Since there can be innumerable potential variants to these types of theories, we will discuss them 
specifically in the context of software industries. This also illustrates the extent to which the software 
industry is rather unique, in that it allows for strong and credible exclusionary mechanisms. This is in 
sharp contrast to some other important cases involving bundling. In GE/Honeywell and Tetra 
Laval/Sidel, for example, the Commission used bundling theory to argue that rival sales might be 
reduced in the short run, but did not specify any mechanism by which such short-run market share 
reductions would lead to benefits in future market power. The software industry is special in the sense 
that some very powerful mechanisms can be clearly identified whereby short-run strategic decisions can 
have likely long-run anticompetitive effects. We will first discuss the best known example in the 
software industry: applications network effects. 
2.1.3.2 A leading example: applications network effects   
As discussed, a major weakness of bundling theories in providing support for concerns about market 
exclusion is that it is typically hard to find a credible link between bundling “today” and competition 
“tomorrow.” This is not true in the software industry.  What is distinctly different in the software 
industry is the existence of types of software that provide “hooks” between application software and the 
operating system. These are programmes (including the operating system itself) that expose the 
application programming interfaces (APIs) to which the developers of applications can write their 
software.  
In today’s world APIs are not always standardised, and instead are frequently proprietary. This means 
that, in many circumstances, a software company must either write several versions of its applications, 
or write its applications for one specific set of proprietary APIs. The first strategy is widely considered 
to be prohibitively costly. Given this, it is, ceteris paribus, most profitable to write for the system that is 
most widely distributed.  As a result, investment incentives of applications developers will lead to much 
greater availability and diversity of applications for the operating systems with the largest market 
shares. In turn, users will have an incentive to choose the operating system that provides the greatest 
variety in applications. This creates a self-reinforcing network effect. More buyers will go to an 
operating system with many applications and given that such an operating system will have higher 
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market share, applications developers will have an even greater preference for writing applications for 
that operating system. This problem has become universally known as the “applications network 
effect”, or the “applications barrier to entry” into markets for operating systems and is seen as the 
leading reason why markets for operating systems are thought to be likely to “tip” towards monopoly.  
An effective monopoly in operating systems however is not inevitable, even when there are strong 
application network effects. If application developers could write to one set of APIs common to all 
operating systems, effective competition between operating systems could be sustained. Even in the 
absence of standards, effective standardization of interfaces across platforms could be achieved through 
some applications software. If such software exposes a rich set of APIs to programme developers, these 
developers could write their software directly to the APIs exposed by these applications (often known 
as “middleware”). There are several ways in which this could generate competition between operating 
systems. First, if the middleware has been written for all major operating systems these would become 
competitors for each other, because they would all be capable of running a similar set of applications. 
But innovative operating system functions could also be embedded in the middleware so that users 
would never have to update their underlying operating system. In this way, middleware could develop 
into a substitute for future versions of the underlying operating system.  
There are two conditions that would make such substitution possible and credible. First, such 
middleware programmes would have to expose (or have the potential to expose) a rich enough set of 
APIs to applications developers to be a viable alternative. Secondly, if such middleware were capable 
of running on different underlying operating systems, it could potentially generate even greater network 
effects for applications developers, by providing access to a range of operating systems including Apple 
and Unix. This could have clear efficiency benefits by achieving standardisation through middleware. 
Both Internet browsers and media players have several basic characteristics that make them highly 
plausible as forms of middleware. There are strong incentives for the developers of such programmes to 
encourage the development of plug-ins, which in turn generates incentives to expose a rich set of APIs. 
Secondly, as was the case with the Netscape browser, the ubiquity of such software across different 
consumer groups generates sufficient incentives to develop the software for different operating systems. 
For this reason, standardisation of APIs across platforms can be achieved through such programmes. 
Application network effects are a powerful mechanism by which leveraging strategies from one period 
can have permanent effects in the future. This has been modelled by Kühn (2001) for the case of 
interoperability, but the analysis can be easily extended to bundling. Essentially, by bundling the 
operating system with its own Internet browser software, the operating system monopolist can generate 
a sunk cost effect on the consumer. The consumer will only purchase the rival software in addition to 
the bundled product if the price is less than the value to him of the quality differential. However, in an 
unbundled market, the consumer would be willing to pay the marginal cost of production plus the 
perceived quality differential to the rival firm. This means that the price that can be extracted by the 
rival is lower, and – in most models – the sales quantity is reduced. This means that the proportion of 
people already owning the rival software is reduced, and applications software offered in the future is 
more likely to be developed for the incumbent operating system. This in turn will reduce the value of 
owning the rival middleware, reinforcing through expectations the market share effect. Indeed for 
middleware that relies on third party plug-ins there is a point at which the expectations about 
applications network effects can generate catastrophic effects because consumers (and applications 
developers) no longer believe that the software will be upgraded in the future. This means that 
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relatively small disadvantages to rivals generated by bundling can have very large effects on excluding 
competition. Carlton and Waldman’s (2000) model of network externalities is essentially along these 
lines. However, they choose to model network externalities exogenously, and do not explicitly consider 
the incentives of application developers. For this reason it does not become clear in their exposition 
that, through the effect on expectations, dramatic market share shifts can be generated. 
Whether the exclusionary mechanism is strategic bundling or degradation of interoperability, it is 
important to emphasise that these exclusionary mechanisms lead to an artificial monopoly position. If 
standardisation of APIs could be achieved in some way – either directly, or indirectly through 
middleware – artificially created brand-specific network effects would turn into industry-wide network 
effects. The result would be divided technological leadership, which could be expected to generate 
considerably more innovation in the industry (see Bresnahan, 2001).  
2.1.3.3 The “Media Player” story: network effects in two-sided markets 
While the applications network effects are the best known way in which network externalities provide a 
link between bundling and future competition, there do exist other such powerful mechanisms. The 
media player part of the recent European Microsoft case provides a particularly interesting example.  
When studying potential foreclosure on media player markets one has to consider two markets. One is 
the market for the actual media players that run on the desktop of personal PCs. The other is software 
that firms like Real, Microsoft, or Apple sell to content providers that allow them to encode their 
content in a format that allows it to be delivered efficiently across a network to a desktop user. This is a 
particularly difficult task for media streaming, i.e. real time delivery of video and/or audio content. 
What connects the software for the desktop and that sold to the content providers is a specifically 
designed proprietary media format. The software that Real provides to a content provider will encode 
content in its proprietary media format while the RealPlayer on a PC will decode from the format into 
the media presentation on screen. Typically other proprietary file formats cannot be decoded by a rival 
company’s media player. For example, when the RealPlayer presents a video in Windows Media File 
format the decoding is actually done by Windows Media Player in the background. Real Player could 
not play such a file without Windows Media Player being present. 
Competition in the market for encoding software for content providers is subject to strong network 
effects. The more PCs that have a decoder for a specific format on them, the more attractive it becomes 
for a content provider to encode in that format. Encoding in multiple formats has been found to be fairly 
expensive, so that content providers prefer using only one format. If that is the case, and all media 
players had the same quality, every content provider should encode with the software for which there 
are most decoders present on PCs. Indeed, even the lowest quality format may be adopted by a content 
provider simply because ubiquity of the decoder allows him to reach more PCs.  
It is then clear that bundling by a firm with dominance in the PC operating system market can in theory 
completely tip the market for encoding software to itself by technically bundling the operating system 
with its media format decoding software. In that case it achieves ubiquity on all PCs while the delivery 
of decoders for other formats will always be imperfect and is empirically of questionable efficacy. This 
is therefore another example of how bundling today can completely change competition in the market 
in the future by changing the basis for competition in the market for encoding software. It should be 
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noted that the dominant position in the operating system market is critical here for the anticompetitive 
effect of bundling. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the negative effects of such bundling strategies can be very large. 
Media formats and encoding technologies are at the forefront of research for Internet technologies. 
There is great value from finding efficient encoding methods to increase the speed of delivery of 
content. Many Internet based activities are only feasible when they can take place at a reasonable speed. 
Eliminating all competition for alternative solutions to the encoding problem would without doubt 
reduce the quality of available software. Note that this does not require some of the media players to 
exit the market. It only requires that investments in them improvement of the technology are 
terminated. This is precisely what has been alleged in the media player part of the European Microsoft 
case. 
2.1.3.4 Financial constraints as a “linkage mechanism” 
In the prohibition of the merger between GE and Honeywell another potential linkage mechanism 
between bundling and future intensity of competition has played a role: financial constraints. We have 
already discussed that it is difficult to make a solid case based on reliable evidence that bundling leads 
to less investment and thus less competition in the future. Financial constraints have the potential to 
make such an argument more plausible. 
With financial constraints the cash flows of firms will determine investment costs and therefore the 
degree of investments. If bundling can severely reduce cash flows by shifting market share and 
intensifying competition then it can influence the investment strategy of competitors. Financially 
constrained competitors would respond to bundling by limiting their investments making them 
permanently less competitive rivals in the future. 
While this argument can be made theoretically water tight, there are important restrictions on what 
relevant evidence is necessary to make the case. For example, economists often incorrectly argue on the 
basis of the financial power of the bundling company. However, in all economic theories in which 
bundling would have the effect of tightening financial constraints and thus reducing R+D investment 
the only relevant question is whether rivals are financially constrained. One of the great shortcomings 
of the GE/Honeywell decision of the European Commission is that it fails to establish any relevant 
financial constraints for the competitors. But without the proof of financial constraints the case misses 
any evidence that this mechanism could lead to harmful effects from bundling. Even if such constraints 
were established it would still be necessary to show that the cost of capital is sufficiently increased 
through such financial constraints that bundling would have a significant effect on investments. This is 
a formidable task, compared to showing network effects that by themselves are known to cause large 
effects. 
2.2 Potential efficiency benefits of bundling  
2.2.1 The economic efficiencies potentially generated by bundling practices can be 
grouped into two main categories: those arising from benefits on the production 
side, and those coming from consumption. In essence, bundling efficiencies 
derive from some form of economy of scope (either on the production or the 
consumption side), yielding an inherent advantage to supplying the goods 
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together rather than apart.  Economies of scope however are necessary but not 
sufficient to provide an efficiency justification for bundling.  Benefits from 
economies of scope frequently can be realised without any need for technical or 
contractual bundling. There is therefore a very limited set of valid efficiency 
defences for bundling practices. In many cases superficially plausible efficiency 
defenses amount to entirely spurious claims. We show in this section with the 
example of the software industry that many potentially valid efficiency claims 
cannot be sustained after a closer look at the industry.15Economies of scope in 
consumption 
One potential class of bundling efficiencies arises from so-called “economies of scope in consumption”: 
i.e., where there are advantages for the customer in purchasing complementary products from the same 
company rather than from two separate suppliers. The leading motivation for bundling in this case is 
transaction cost savings.16 For example, software is physically bundled on the same disk so that 
consumers do not have to deal with multiple ways of obtaining software.17  
Software is a good example of a case in which there are likely to be economies of scope on the 
consumer side, but in which technical or contractual bundling does not seem necessary to realise these 
economies.  First, the existence of such consumer-side economies of scope does not require the 
programme codes to be intermingled, but merely to be supplied on a single disk.  Second, even if there 
are economies from supplying multiple programmes on a single disk, it is not clear that these 
programmes need to be sold as a bundle.  It would appear that most of the benefits attributed to 
bundling could be generated by physically placing all of the software that some customers may want to 
install on the same disk but without selling the software on a bundled basis. Since most commercial 
software requires registration in order for the programme to be activated, additional software could be 
purchased during the registration process. Indeed, this is already the case today for a lot of software 
preloaded by OEMs. Essentially, the customer obtains software for a trial period and can then purchase 
it. When there are strong concerns about anticompetitive effects of bundling, it is by no means clear that 
the efficiencies arising from joint distribution of software are significant enough to provide a strong 
efficiency defence of the bundling practice of concern. 
Software that is pre-installed by an OEM might seem like a different case than software that the 
customer loads from a disk.  In the case of software that is pre-installed, the customer does not have to 
take the time to install the software; the OEM has already done the installation work.  But here again it 
is important to distinguish between economies of scope in distribution (which may argue for pre-
installation by OEMs) and whether pre-installed software needs to be sold on a bundled basis.   
                                                     
15
 Note, that this does not imply that we are sceptical that efficiency benefits can arise from bundling. There will 
be many cases in which bundling will have important efficiency benefits. The purpose of this section is to point 
out that efficiency arguments about bundling practices in antitrust settings are often unwarranted. 
16
 A common type of economies of scope on the consumer-side is generated by shopping costs. These generate the 
consumer side benefits of department stores or supermarkets (so-called “one-stop shopping”). 
17
 Cost savings of such a strategy may also arise on the side of the seller who may save on distribution costs. 
These are again transaction costs and exactly the same argument applies as in the case of transaction costs on the 
side of consumers. For this reason we do not discuss such distribution costs separately (although in this case the 
cost saving is to the supplier, and this justifies a discount for the bundle). However this kind of economy of scope 
in distribution differs from joint production in that the saving is specific to the customer taking both products (e.g. 
cable telephony and TV services, which are cheaper as a bundle). 
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There would appear to be two ways of allowing consumers choice between different software products 
without jeopardizing the benefits of pre-installation. First, the OEM could pre-install a number of 
competing products on all PCs shipped. The consumer could then choose on the desktop which of the 
programs to activate and could pay for the software chosen in the process of registration. Given that 
many software companies including Microsoft require registration to activate the pre-installed 
programs, allowing consumers choice on the desktop in this manner would not be very burdensome to 
consumers. This would then be an unbundled solution that realises all of the pre-installation efficiencies 
the consumer obtains by not having to go through the process of inserting disks and waiting for the 
installation process to finish. 
A second possibility of allowing full choice among unbundled programs without foregoing pre-
installation efficiencies is by having consumers choose among the major programs they want to 
purchase at the time of purchase of the computer itself. This is, in fact, already current practice, albeit 
with a limited set of choices. Consumers are typically given the choice of pre-installation of a range of 
Microsoft products and also some non-Microsoft products when ordering from OEMs. If Internet 
browsers or media players were unbundled there would be no problem in allowing consumers a choice 
between the products of competing companies for each one of these product groups (unless exclusivity 
contracts between software producers and OEMs undermined such choice). There would be only a 
single payment to the OEM of the computer. The computer would come delivered with the preferred 
programs installed. Again all the pre-installation benefits would be realised but without bundling.  
Other arguments about consumer benefits from software bundling are similarly poorly supported. For 
example, it is sometimes claimed that efficiencies could arise from higher expected quality or 
functionality when components have to function together. Consumers may think that using the web 
browser produced by the software company that produces the operating system would be less likely to 
crash than that of a competitor less familiar with the operating system. However, while this may be an 
argument for consumers to purchase both products from the same software company, it does not imply 
that bundling is necessary to realise these possible efficiencies.  
2.2.2 Production-side economies from bundling 
Since bundling is primarily a sales strategy, most of the potential efficiency effects should arise on the 
customer side (or, more generally, in distribution). This means that it is highly unlikely that production- 
side economies can be a justification for bundling unless consumers have an interest in buying the 
products together.  
There could be a case for technical bundling when there are economies of scale in the assembly of 
complementary parts of a product. For example, in the assembly of a car the production technology 
used by a car manufacturer can assemble the parts at much lower cost than an individual customer 
purchasing the parts separately. But even this does not always constitute sufficient reason for bundling: 
often the customer can choose the components separately and then have the manufacturer do a custom 
assembly. However, given the costs of product design there are often only limited possibilities to do this 
cheaply. Cases for efficient bundling are therefore relatively easy to construct under such 
circumstances, although it is not always a foregone conclusion that economies of scale in assembly will 
necessarily lead to bundling at the sales stage. 
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In software markets it is more difficult to understand how economies of scope in production require 
bundling in the sale of software.  For example, there may be economies of scope from developing code 
for related programmes within a single firm, but it is not obvious that programmes need to be sold 
together to realise the benefit of these economies of joint development.  
One possibility is that there may be economies from intermingling the code of different programmes 
and this therefore requires technical bundling (“integration”) of the programmes.  Microsoft has argued 
the technical bundling of its Internet Explorer browser and its Windows operating system is an example 
of this.  We are not software engineers, but we accept that designing programmes to share code between 
two products could theoretically have potential benefits, if the performance of the programmes would 
be enhanced. However, there is a question whether intermingling of code would have this effect for 
large pieces of software. As we understand it, there is also a potential economic inefficiency associated 
with such software structures: by intermingling codes rather than constructing software in a modular 
fashion, it may be more difficult to trace programming problems.      
Ultimately the question of the efficiencies of particular software structures can be resolved only by 
gathering and assessing factual evidence. However, as we discuss in more detail below, in considering 
this question, it is important to adopt an ex ante perspective.  In the case of Internet Explorer and 
Windows, the relevant question is whether these programmes had to be designed in an intermingled 
manner in order to realise efficiencies.  If there were no design reasons to intermingle the code, then it 
would create perverse incentives if Microsoft were allowed to defend an ex ante exclusionary design 
decision on the grounds that ex post it would be difficult to separate its browser programme from its 
operating system programme.18      
                                                     
18
 Yet this appears to be Microsoft’s argument.  In the US antitrust case, Microsoft spent considerable effort on 
trying to prove that it could not separate the browser from the rest of the operating system without damaging the 
functionality of the OS.  Experts for the US government contested this claim.  However the more important point 
is that even if Microsoft had proved that it would be difficult to separate Internet Explorer and Windows ex post, 
that would have not in any way proved the existence of strong economies ex ante in writing the operating system 
and the browser programmes together in such a way that the code is intermingled in the first place. 
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3 Some errors in the interpretation of economic theories of bundling, 
and their policy consequences 
When discussing the insights of economic theory on the competitive effects of bundling practices, 
errors are frequently made in interpreting the theory and its implications for policy. This is so both for 
those who try to create the impression that competition policy should never address bundling at all; and 
for those who advocate an overly restrictive policy towards bundling. We will discuss the first set of 
arguments with reference to the paper by Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla since their contribution contains 
several fallacies of this kind. On the other hand we will use recent decisions by the European 
Commission to show how an overly restrictive policy is unwarranted as well. The first view essentially 
relies on a blanket assertion of efficiencies while downplaying the applicability of anticompetitive 
theories of bundling. The second downplays efficiencies and relies simply on the theoretical possibility 
of anticompetitive effects in some models to claim anticompetitive effects in specific cases. Both 
approaches cannot be a basis for a sound competition policy towards bundling. 
3.1 Errors in attributing efficiencies to bundling 
We will first show how the fact that bundling can entail efficiencies can be abused for sweeping claims 
about policy. There are several kinds of erroneous arguments. First, efficiencies that are attributed to 
bundling often can be achieved without bundling. Second, efficiency claims for technical bundling are 
given with reference to examples where this occurs. At the same time the abundance of examples in 
which such potential joint production does not occur is suppressed. Third, theories are misinterpreted to 
lead to efficiency effects of bundling when these theories do not imply such conclusions at all. 
The most common example of the first error is the joint production fallacy. For example, Ahlborn, 
Evans and Padilla claim that tying can make economies of scope possible, giving as an example that 
“machines may be may be utilized to manufacture two or more products, allowing the producer to 
reduce the size or complexity of its factories”.  As we have already explained, there is no reason why 
products that are jointly produced should necessarily be sold together. There are countless examples of 
products that are jointly produced but are sold to different customers. An example could be  the refinery 
output of different crude oil derivatives. General claims on efficiencies generated by bundling ignore 
the point that any efficiency enhancing bundling must be driven by preferences for joint consumption 
(i.e., complementarity between the goods). But even when there is a preference for joint consumption, it 
is not necessary for complements to be sold on a bundled basis, unless this action itself leads to real 
economies.  
The second error in dealing with potential efficiencies of bundling is to selectively focus on some 
markets that seem to support efficiencies. Ultimately such examples say little more than that it might be 
cheaper for a firm to combine complementary parts, than for a consumer to do so. While this may 
sometimes be the case, we cannot ignore the many counter-examples to this claim. Children’s toys 
frequently have to be assembled by the buyer. For furniture it is very common that assembly has to be 
done by the buyer. Indeed, the IKEA business model relies on the fact that, for some customers and 
some products, there are efficiency gains when the customer assembles the furniture. Indeed, the actual 
complexity of the tasks of assembling children’s toys or furniture is arguably greater than it is to attach 
a plug to an electrical appliance  (A leading  example cited by Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla for consumer 
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benefits from product integration.)  Basing strong conclusions on casual empiricism is a dangerous 
exercise.  There is no basis for going from the fact that product integration sometimes produces 
consumer benefits to the conclusion that product integration almost invariably produces consumer 
benefits.  
Some claims for the general efficiency benefits of bundling also arise from simple misinterpretation of 
theory. For example, Ahlborn, Evans, and Padilla claim that bundling allows the realisation of the so-
called Cournot effect (Cournot 1838, see also Nalebuff 1999). The “Cournot effect” refers to Cournot’s 
observation that it is better for a single multi-product monopolist to sell all complementary parts of a 
system, than for all parts being sold by single-component monopolists. This observation is no 
justification for bundling or product integration. The price effect is achieved simply because all of the 
products are sold by the same firm: but it does not depend on bundling at all. For instance, when a 
monopolist sells complementary products it will set lower prices than independent producers: this is due 
to internalisation of the complementarity between the products, and has nothing to do with bundling. 
The effect will also be of little impact if there is significant competition in the markets for all parts. 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, Nalebuff (2000) shows that bundling of parts by one firm with market 
power will typically increase prices when there are independent competitors for individual parts – at 
least if there are enough parts. As explained above in Section 2, this result is driven by precisely the 
same Cournot effect. 
The essential underlying error in approaching bundling from a claim of large, generalized efficiencies is 
that there is no theoretical or empirical underpinning that can justify such an approach. Whether there 
are efficiency effects to bundling or not will always have to rely on a careful analysis of the specific 
industry. But it should be noted that the scope for valid efficiency claims is much narrower than some 
authors want us to believe. 
3.2 Efficiency claims that are irrelevant to competition analysis 
One strategy to talk up the efficiency effects of bundling in competition cases is to discuss efficiencies 
in the context of industries in which there would never be a competition concern in the first place. For 
example, sometimes the efficiency claims that are made are in fact irrelevant to what tends to constitute 
“bundling” in the competition literature. It simply does not inform competition analysis to point out that 
one can think of almost any product as a bundle of its inputs. To imply through examples that such 
“bundling” would have violated US antitrust law (in the days of the per se prohibition against bundling) 
is highly misleading. Even historic per se prohibitions have been conditioned on essential elements 
such as strong market power of the bundling firm over a component part, and – as a consequence – 
significant asymmetries between competitors in the length of the product line of complementary 
components. 
Once this is taken into consideration, some of the efficiency arguments fall apart. For instance, 
Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla claim that only by allowing bundling can industries achieve product 
innovations such as Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios, and the minivan. The key point is that none of the 
components of these products appear to be even near monopolised. It is true that there is product 
innovation in both of these products: no one had previously thought of putting the components together 
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in quite this way.19 The implication the authors draw is that such innovation could not take place were 
bundling prohibited. But there is no basis for this conclusion.  
To see that the conclusions may well be reversed, consider the following hypothetical example. 
Suppose there was a worldwide monopoly supplier of wheat flour, which sells only baked products and 
refuses to sell flour to other bakers. The monopolist never thought of making apple pie and, when Aunt 
Millie had the idea, she realised pretty quickly that she could not get the flour to make it. In this 
example innovation can only be reduced by technical bundling. There is no efficiency benefit here in 
the sense that “product integration” does not help innovation.20 There is no point in making efficiency 
claims with reference to market structures that are implicitly perfectly competitive, when competition 
policy intervention both in the US and in the EU have been premised on the presence of significant 
market power. 
3.3 Ignoring the presence of robust effects in the theoretical literature 
Proponents of a more lenient policy towards bundling tend to quickly dismiss the available body of 
theoretical literature as irrelevant to their claims. For example, Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla write: “(…) 
any game theoretic analysis […] is notoriously fragile” (e.g. p. 50). Such a claim is not supportable. It is 
true that certain theories are only valid under certain market conditions. But one can make clear 
statements about the relative robustness of different theories, as we have indicated in the previous 
section and specify the circumstances under which the theory is more likely to apply. To claim that a 
laissez faire Chicago School analysis, that is not game theoretic, is more robust would be similarly 
incorrect. It is now well understood that Chicago School modelling tends to ignore the elements that are 
crucial for generating anticompetitive effects of contracting practices(see Bernheim and Whinston 
1992).  The challenge for the formulation of policy prescriptions from theory is to identify the features 
of models that are robust across different modelling approaches and to identify observable 
characteristics of markets that have a large impact on whether anticompetitive effects can be expected 
or not. The theory of bundling surveyed in the previous section can serve precisely to accomplish this 
task. 
 
Unfortunately, discussions of policy towards bundling often either ignore robust effects focussing 
excessively on the intricacies of specific models or use sweeping generalizations drawn from specific 
models that ignore the relevant restrictive assumptions. What is typically missing from these treatments 
is an emphasis on what is robust. Our discussion in the previous section does capture three robust 
features of bundling theory that are typically not mentioned by laissez faire proponents. 
Among the robust effects generally ignored by economists advocating a laissez-faire approach is, for 
example, Nalebuff’s observation that prices tend to increase with the relative length of the product line 
                                                     
19
 To call Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios a product improvement and praise its health benefits is in any case somewhat 
overstated. Most economists would see this rather as an example of horizontal product differentiation. The quoted 
study by Jerry Hausman (see Jerry Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition, 
in The Economics of New Goods 209, 234 (T. Bresnahan and R. Gordon eds, 1997) is also one of the most 
criticised pieces of empirical research in this field (see Bresnahan)).  
20
 It may indeed be in the interest of the producer to sell flour to Aunt Millie in the simplest example. But as soon 
as we add price discrimination incentives or other valid foreclosure mechanisms the flour monopolist might not.  
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of the bundling firm because of the Cournot coordination problem among the competing 
complementary goods producers. This a robust effect across any modelling approach one may take. 
Similarly, the robust element in Carlton and Waldman (2002) comes from the basic structure of 
generating exclusionary effects Their mechanism is closely analogous to that put forward by Bernheim 
and Whinston (1991) in an exclusive dealing context. The key feature of these contributions is to show 
how short-run inefficient exclusionary behaviour can, through some intertemporal link, lead to 
anticompetitive effects. This is the robust feature of all such models: they are driven by some direct 
intertemporal link between restrictive practice in one period, and the rivals’ ability to compete in the 
future. There are a number of conceivable practices that provide such a link, and it is the plausibility of 
those features in each particular case that needs to be assessed.  
Another clear conclusion from the theory that is often ignored is that network effects provide the single 
most plausible link between market share shifting through bundling today and future reduction in 
competition in the future. The “applications network effect” in the software industry has been long 
identified as a particularly robust mechanism by which foreclosure can occur. Yet these important 
qualitative implications of the theoretical literature are not even mentioned. Similarly, the European 
Commission has tended to ignore this large qualitative difference between the Microsoft case and its 
controversial merger cases that were based on bundling concerns. It is clear that network effects can 
much more easily lead to large anticompetitive effects of bundling than, for example, financial 
constraints can.  
A lack of focus on the distinction between robust and specific elements of theory has also hampered 
competition policy in Europe. The approach by the European Commission in cases like Tetra 
Laval/Sidel or GE/Honeywell has been to provide a laundry list of possible anticompetitive 
mechanisms of bundling without a clear specification whether the conditions for which the theories 
yield anticompetitive effects could be verified in the industry. For example, there are suggestions in the 
European Commission’s decisions in GE/Honeywell and Tetra/Laval that anticompetitive effects can 
arise for reasons related to financial strength, but the precondition of financially constrained 
competitors is never discussed. Instead there is only mention of the financial strength of the company 
that might bundle the products – which, as discussed above, is not the right question.   
Building a case based on anticompetitive theories of bundling without careful analysis of whether 
anticompetitive bundling is likely given the specific characteristics of the relevant markets is just as bad 
from a policy perspective as overly broad claims that competitive effects of bundling are invariably 
innocuous.      
3.4 Errors in the theory of policy  
One of the most fundamental errors made in recent discussions about the design of competition policy 
towards bundling concerns the design of “optimal” policy. The so-called “Decision Theoretic 
approach” to competition policy design developed by Hylton and Salinger (2001) has been used to 
argue for an approach that effectively results in per-se legality of bundling. However, the analysis by 
Hylton and Salinger (2001) is cannot be used as a sound basis for policy making: First, and most 
importantly, it applies decision theory incorrectly to the competition problem at hand. Secondly, it is 
based on an implicit assumption that the cost of anticompetitive behaviour is small. 
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Hylton and Salinger (2001) argue on the basis of examples from many competitive markets that 
bundling without anticompetitive effects is so prevalent, that the probability of anticompetitive effects 
arising is very small, and that one’s prior belief should therefore be that bundling is not anticompetitive. 
This argument is entirely misplaced.  The issue is not the ex ante probability that a given instance of 
bundling is likely to be anticompetitive.  What matters for a competition authority’s decision to pursue 
a case further is a conditional probability.  As outlined above, and discussed further below in more 
detail, the economic literature on bundling suggests an initial set of conditions that can be used as a 
preliminary filter, to identify cases in which bundling should never be challenged.  For example, absent 
very significant market power by one firm, bundling cannot have serious anti-competitive effects. The 
relevant question then is: How likely are anti-competitive effects if all the conditions that would 
guarantee that bundling is benign are absent?  This probability may in fact be relatively high.  At a 
minimum, the relevant probability cannot be assessed just from the observation that bundling is 
“common”.  
But a proper decision theoretic analysis does not only assess the appropriate probability of 
anticompetitive effects but also the probability that bundling has efficiency enhancing effects and the 
magnitude of such effects. At this point the per-se legality argument becomes especially obscure. 
Nowhere do the authors  discuss how to assess the potential costs of permitting bundling. Implicitly 
their policy conclusion can be justified only if these costs are expected to be small relative to the 
efficiency benefits. However, as we have discussed above, claims of efficiencies are fragile in the sense 
that they do not fit every industry equally well, and can often be achieved without product bundling. On 
the potential social costs of anticompetitive effects nothing is said. But in the case of the computer 
industry, the cost may be the complete monopolisation of one of the most important backbone 
industries of the economy.  
The arguments made on bundling by Hylton and Salinger and other supporters of a “laissez faire” 
approach to bundling are not better grounded in theory because they refer to “decision theory”. Indeed, 
“decision theory” would prescribe something much more intricate, namely some sequence of relevant 
evidence that a competition policy authority should follow in its investigations with the goal that an 
investigation can be stopped when anticompetitive effects do not seem likely enough. For example, in 
any complaint a competition authority may first look for characteristics like market power that are 
necessary conditions for anti-competitive effects to be present. If it does not find the conditions to be 
present it can simply stop the proceedings. If strong market power is present it may study the industry 
further to find out what reasonable anticompetitive mechanism could be at work. If some evidence 
strongly speaks against this mechanism, the investigation could be stopped, etc. This means that an 
optimal policy should always be thought of as an optimal stopping rule for investigations. Our policy 
proposal below is in this spirit. 
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4 Criteria for a competition assessment of bundling 
An effective competition policy assessment of bundling practices should focus on those specific 
features that economic theory identifies as necessary for generating anticompetitive effects. In order to 
create a reasonable decision rule based on bundling theories, we need to go further than presenting a 
long “laundry list” of assumptions from models that have generated exclusionary effects. In  the spirit 
of an optimal stopping rule for investigations we want a rule that starts with characteristics that are most 
easily observed and/or can quickly filter out obviously innocuous cases of bundling  thus saving 
enforcement resources. We believe the following three-step approach for determining when 
intervention against bundling is in this spirit and fully uses the theoretical insights the economic 
literature has provided. An effective decision rule needs to satisfy three functions: 
- First, it needs to create a ‘safe haven’ for circumstances in which bundling should not generate 
any competition concerns; 
- Second, it should produce criteria that make it possible to decide whether bundling is 
sufficiently likely to have anticompetitive effects, so that intervention should be justified; 
- Third, it needs to consider efficiency-enhancing effects that might provide a countervailing 
effect to the competition analysis. 
The safe haven rules allow for a quick closing of cases that are of no concern. Indeed, such safe haven 
rules will guarantee that there will be no complainants in such cases in the first place. Conditional on 
passing the safe haven test a careful analysis of the industry is required, to assess whether there is a 
coherent and plausible mechanism for anticompetitive effects. Only if this argument can be made 
should one go the further step to assess the efficiency claims for bundling, which are much harder to 
evaluate.  
4.1 “Safe haven” rules 
The economic literature implies that the following observable criteria can be employed as initial filters 
to determine when bundling should never be challenged.  Bundling should never be challenged unless 
all three of the following conditions are satisfied: 
Market power in one of the bundled products.  This is an obvious condition that accords with current 
EU policy.  Because intervention against bundling (especially technical bundling) is a significant 
regulatory action, there is a clear case for the competition authorities only to be interested in cases in 
which market power is strong, i.e. the firm must have achieved clear dominance in the market for at 
least one of the bundled products. 
Complementarity.  The economic literature reviewed above implies that complementarity between 
different components of a bundle is an essential ingredient for all robust theories of anticompetitive 
harm through bundling. The implication is that when such complementarities do not exist, it is probably 
appropriate to exclude bundling from antitrust scrutiny.  
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Asymmetry in product lines.  The economic literature also suggests that a strong asymmetry between the 
product range of the bundling firm (what economists call the ‘length of product line’) and that of its 
competitors is more likely to be problematic. Where more products can be offered as part of the same 
bundle, there are greater opportunities for “Cournot effects” to arise, and this in turn greatly increases 
the likelihood of anticompetitive bundling (as shown by Nalebuff (2001)). Indeed, all theories of 
foreclosure through anticompetitive bundling rely ultimately on some such ‘product line asymmetry’ 
between the dominant bundling firm and its rivals.  
Conversely, where components are offered in a bundle by all firms in the industry, we typically do not 
even talk about bundling at all: for instance in the car industry, all manufacturers routinely sell a 
combination of wheels, steering wheels, motor and chassis, and this is not generally described as 
‘bundling’. The term ‘bundling’ tends to be reserved only for cases where a manufacturer includes 
some special features in his standard models that others sell as independent upgrades, or not at all.  
Concerns about anticompetitive bundling are also weaker when the bundled extras are of minor 
economic importance relative to the value of the bundling product (which is typically the case with 
cars). Thus references to the bundling of components in the car industry21 are misleading as they 
overlook the central point that significant asymmetries in product line (especially in terms of value) are 
a central criterion for bundling to assume relevance in competition terms – and to generate antitrust 
concerns. 
Absent these three characteristics, bundling will fail to produce substantial anticompetitive effects, and 
the authorities’ investigation should not proceed. Significantly, note that the examples cited by 
advocates of a laissez-faire approach to bundling (e.g. cars and electric plugs) all fail to satisfy one of 
these conditions. These would therefore fall under a safe haven provision.22  
Conversely, all three of these criteria are met in the software industry, and are specifically relevant for 
assessing bundling practices between operating systems and products such as browsers or media 
players. On this basis, at least prima facie concerns are justified in the market for media players, which 
was one of the targets of the Commission’s decision against Microsoft.   
4.2 Determining whether anticompetitive effects are likely 
Establishing that the initial screening criteria are met should not be enough to justify intervention 
against bundling.  Once concluded that the safe haven rule does not apply, a good competition policy 
rule should aim to discriminate as systematically as possible between truly anticompetitive cases, and 
innocent bundling.  
                                                     
21
 See e.g. Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla at 3, 38 (“there is no such thing as an unbundled car”). 
22
  Note also that the availability of an easily verifiable “safe haven” rule also makes clear why the “decision 
theory” arguments of Hylton and Salinger are highly misleading. With reference to a number of ‘innocent’ tying 
cases, Ahlborn, Evans and Padilla and Hylton and Salinger argue that the probability of anticompetitive bundling 
should be taken as extremely low. But that ignores the fact that a safe haven rule completely excludes the trivial 
bundling cases from consideration. Once the obviously innocent cases are filtered out, the ex ante probability that 
bundling may have anticompetitive effects may be quite high. Given the low cost of verifying these screening 
conditions, all that should matter for the decision rule adopted by the competition authority should be only the 
conditional probability, given this information. Given that this probability can be quite high, there is no basis for a 
modified per se legality rule.. 
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In practice, such a decision rule cannot be based on a set of pre-determined market characteristics, as 
there are numerous theories of bundling that can yield possible anticompetitive effects, and the 
conditions under which they apply may differ considerably.  Indeed, as it is not possible to specify in 
advance all strong, plausible foreclosure theories that might arise in future, it is also impossible to 
provide a coherent and comprehensive list of features that would need to be checked in order to decide 
whether bundling is anticompetitive. In each individual case it will be necessary to show that there 
exists a coherent theory, broadly fitting the easily observable characteristics of the industry, which 
demonstrates that foreclosure effects – not limited to exit – are plausible. This part of the investigation 
should specify a clear exclusionary mechanism, which should then inform the subsequent search for 
appropriate evidence.23   
Effects that depend on a strong intertemporal mechanism, by which bundling today affects the 
competitiveness of markets tomorrow, tend to be the most robust, and in that area there is greater scope 
for finding convincing evidence. Thus in order to establish whether certain bundling practices have a 
significant impact on competition, it will be necessary to show that in the specific market in question 
there exists some credible mechanism linking bundling in one period to competitive conditions in the 
next; and this will inform the determination of whether there is empirical evidence suggesting that the 
theory is relevant to the industry.   
A number of mechanisms linking bundling today to competition conditions in the future can be 
identified in the software industry, some of which we have discussed in Section 2. We cannot discuss 
all possible theories, but will focus in particular the most powerful such mechanisms, thosebased on 
network effects. These are understood well enough today, and create one of the most robust linkages 
between current bundling practices, and future intensity of competition.  Our discussion of this 
mechanism  provides an example of how qualitative predictions from theory can be used to identify 
informative evidence on the relevance of the mechanism in the specific market considered.  There are 
other pieces of evidence that can also help establish whether bundling can have anticompetitive effects. 
These are discussed further below. 
4.2.1 Assessing network effect based mechanisms 
Let us first consider ‘applications network effects’. As discussed in Section 2, an ‘applications network 
effect’ can lead to robust intertemporal linkages (i.e. linkages between actions today and effects 
tomorrow) that can produce credible anticompetitive effects.  Of course, not all software products can 
generate such effects when bundled with an operating system. Two essential conditions must hold:  
- first, it must be necessarily the case that the ‘applications network effect’ occurs at the level of 
a given brand, rather than the whole industry; that is, that the value of adopting a particular 
product increases with the number of other adopters of the same brand (otherwise the network 
effect could not be used by a dominant firm to exclude rivals, as all would benefit from it). In 
most cases, brand-specific network effects arise due to the use of proprietary standards; 
                                                     
23
 This has the advantage of conditioning the costly part of an investigation – the search for evidence – on the 
specific prescriptions of the theory. It has also the advantage of allowing for an investigation to be closed early on, 
where there is no theory of anticompetitive bundling that appears plausible enough for the industry in question 
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- secondly, it must be the case that the products in question expose or have the potential to 
expose a rich set of APIs to applications software developers. That is to say, the applications 
network effects can justify intervention against bundling only for the bundling of software that 
has the potential for developing into middleware.  
These are two very clear criteria for further identifying cases where there should be no concern over 
anticompetitive bundling, and those where concerns are instead legitimate. Indeed this approach 
excludes intervention against bundling in the great majority of markets, and ensures that  policy against 
bundling does not interfere with product design, particularly in sectors with a system of industry-wide 
compatibility standards.  
Now consider network externalities from two sided adoption as in the media player example. In this 
case it is necessary to identify what the proprietary standard is that needs to be adopted. Furthermore it 
needs to be verified that it is costly for content providers to encode in multiple formats. Finally, it needs 
to be established that the bundling practice can in fact change the market shares in the relevant 
market.24  
But the network effect based theories of anticompetitive harm from bundling do not only generate 
criteria for eliminating cases from consideration. They can also point to the type of evidence we should 
be looking for, to conclude it is highly likely that bundling has anticompetitive effects. Network effects 
based theories point to a very informative piece of empirical evidence. As explained in Section 2, 
anticompetitive effects will be particularly strong where applications developers take bundling as a 
signal that network effect will make competing middleware lose significant market share over time. If 
this is the case, market share can swing dramatically to the dominant firm. The expectations of 
applications developers are therefore crucial to the operation of the mechanism.  Applications 
developers themselves can be surveyed on this point. Suppose that, in answer to appropriately framed 
questions, the competition authority was to find that there is significant consensus by a large proportion 
of the developers’ community that the competing software will fail as a result of bundling by the 
dominant firm. This should provide strong evidence that anticompetitive effects are very likely. Such 
conclusions could be supported by empirical evidence that development activity is already shifting 
away from the competing products.  Forward-looking and incipient evidence of this kind should be 
given particular weight in cases where the concern is to prevent lasting harm: if the requirement for 
antitrust intervention was finding direct evidence of exclusion, then potentially irreversible 
anticompetitive harm would already have been done before any intervention took place.  
In summary, when there are demonstrable strong network effects, it will be safe to conclude that 
anticompetitive effects are likely. These effects are understood well enough today, to make it possible 
to conclude that they create one of the most robust linkages between current bundling practices, and 
future intensity of competition.  Of course, the plausibility of these effects being at play in each specific 
case must be carefully verified.   
                                                     
24
 The European Commission has developed evidence on all of these factors in its investigation of the media 
player part of the Microsoft case.   
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4.2.2 Evidence about likely effects: the role of investment and R&D 
Another forward-looking criterion for assessing the possible anticompetitive effects of bundling should 
be the R&D and investment behaviour of firms developing competing software to that of the dominant 
bundling firm. Economic theory predicts that, in anticipation of network effects, competitors’ 
investment in the development and improvement of middleware products should decline as a response 
to bundling. While it is very difficult to interpret raw investment data, there can be circumstances where 
it is quite clear that competitors’ investments and R&D are being undermined, and this should generate 
a compelling case for anticompetitive effects. For instance, if competitors could produce boardroom 
and other internal documents showing that management has taken strategic decisions to limit product 
development, specifically as a consequence of the dominant firm’s bundling strategy, this would serve 
as strong evidence that bundling is producing significant exclusionary effects. This should be relatively 
easy to distinguish from discussions that the product was simply not popular enough for other reasons.25    
4.2.3 Evidence of intent to exclude 
A further important element for assessing the anticompetitive scope of bundling practices would be any 
available evidence of the intent of the bundling decision. A useful analogy can be drawn here with 
policies against collusion. In determining whether to punish firms for collusion, competition authorities 
today do not generally seek to prove that prices are higher than they would otherwise have been: this is 
technically very difficult to infer just from market data. They tend to focus instead on evidence of 
communication between firms about prices. As there are no good efficiency reasons for communicating 
on prices, the finding that such communication takes place is deemed as sufficient evidence for the 
existence of anticompetitive practices, with likely anticompetitive effects.  
Bundling is of course somewhat different in that there is at least the possibility that it may generate 
efficiency benefits (while it is difficult to see any efficiency reasons for rivals to be talking about price). 
But evidence about what decision makers thought they were doing when taking a decision should still 
be relevant. Showing ‘intent’ will not just involve some evidence that managers talked about the 
exclusionary effects of bundling. However, documentation that exclusion was a motivation, together 
with the absence of documents demonstrating significant discussions of efficiency gains, should be 
taken as compelling evidence of intent. An important reference point for a policy rule here can be the 
way that evidence of intent was used in the US case against Microsoft. There was evidence from 
Microsoft’s internal communications that the only reason for technical bundling of its browser with the 
operating system – i.e., the intermingling of the code – was to exclude Netscape from the market (see 
Bresnahan 2001). Such evidence appropriately played an important role in the case.  
Overall, if the theoretical criteria for bundling to have plausible anticompetitive effects are satisfied, 
strong evidence of intent should be sufficient to convict a firm of anticompetitive bundling. Thus any 
documentary evidence of executives discussing the deployment of certain strategies to exclude 
competitors, combined with a plausible theoretical mechanism, should be sufficient for finding an 
antitrust violation. 
                                                     
25
 One of the problems in the EU merger cases is that such evidence could not possibly be available because 
bundling was not practiced pre-merger. As a result the body of evidence that can be used in a merger case that 
attempts to block a merger because of anticipated future bundling is dramatically reduced relative to an abuse 
case. See Kühn (2002) for a critique of bundling arguments in merger cases based on this observation. 
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4.2.4 Absence of efficiency motivations 
Advocates of a laissez-faire approach to bundling often present an efficiency defence as a 
countervailing argument to antitrust concerns. In practice, however, it is difficult to implement a 
suitable trade-off calculus, properly ‘offsetting’ anticompetitive effects against efficiency benefits. A 
more realistic approach is to recognise that evidence for efficiencies and, conversely, the absence of 
convincing efficiency arguments, contains primarily qualitative information about firms’ intent (see 
Kühn (2002), and Neven and Seabright (2002). The absence of convincing efficiency arguments should 
be taken as evidence that these are unlikely to be significant, and that bundling is more likely to have 
been driven by anticompetitive motives. 
For instance, in the Microsoft browser case in the US, Microsoft provided virtually no evidence that 
there were real efficiency benefits of intermingling code.  Microsoft argued instead that its operating 
system could not function properly if the browser were separated. However all that this proves is that, 
once in place, it is costly to ‘undo’ technical bundling. It does not show at all that technical bundling 
was an efficient strategy at the time of planning the software architecture. Indeed, given the additional 
documentary evidence on Microsoft’s exclusionary intent of the strategy, it may well be the case that 
Microsoft actually chose an inefficient software construction to further its anticompetitive aims. It is 
only ex ante efficiencies that should matter for the antitrust assessment. High costs for ex post 
unbundling should be viewed simply as a penalty on the firm for having used anticompetitive bundling 
in the first place. 
4.3 Assessing efficiency defences 
As bundling can generate efficiency benefits, these should be taken into consideration even when the 
conditions for justified intervention developed in the previous subsection are satisfied.  
However, in assessing efficiency defences a substantial problem arises: the firm that claims the 
efficiencies typically has much better information about the true nature of such claims than the antitrust 
authority. This does not only apply to the general nature of such efficiencies, but also to how they 
should be demonstrated. Any efficiency defence rule will inevitably have to deal with these problems.  
It is therefore reasonable for the competition authority to do two things: first, to consider only those 
efficiencies that are explicitly claimed by the bundling company.  Secondly, because the company has 
private information about how it achieves these efficiencies, to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant. Note that these costs should not be regarded as unreasonable, in circumstances where an 
initial investigation has established a high probability of competitive harm. This is also the reason why 
efficiency claims should only be explored after the competitive assessment. If there is no reasonable 
anticompetitive theory, there should be no reason to impose the burden on the firm to demonstrate 
efficiency effects. 
When a coherent theory of foreclosure has been developed, and there is evidence that the mechanism in 
question is indeed operating in the market, the costs of providing the necessary information appear 
relatively small against the potentially large social losses from foreclosure. Placing the burden of proof 
on the defendant has the desirable effect of avoiding ‘wrong’ convictions for anticompetitive bundling. 
Note also that the costs of trying to come up with an efficiency defence will tend to be higher for a firm 
that does not truly create them through bundling (see Kuhn (2002) and Neven and Seabright (2002)).  In 
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this way, efficiency defences can be used as a further screening device to discriminate innocent from 
anticompetitive bundling in actual cases. 
Economists advocating a laissez-faire approach to bundling propose a different rule (that the burden of 
proof for efficiencies should be placed on the competition authority) that does not appear at all sensible 
when one is really concerned about “minimising errors” (i.e. reducing the risk that wrong decisions may 
be taken). Given the private information of the company about efficiencies, putting the burden of proof 
on the competition authority will lead to less information being revealed, and therefore a more random 
decision rule. Allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff would only reduce the probability of an 
anticompetitive finding; but it would not reduce the probability of error. It is therefore clearly not an 
optimal rule for the assessment of efficiencies.  
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5 Conclusions  
In this paper we have reviewed the key insights and policy implications of modern bundling theory, in 
response to the ongoing debate about the competition policy treatment of bundling. We have shown that 
the radical claims made by some economists supporting per-se legality of bundling do not find support 
in a careful reading of economic theory. We show, in contrast that there are clear economic criteria to 
identify industries where anticompetitive bundling can be an issue and point to clear empirical criteria 
for a finding of anticompetitive bundling. Under the rules we suggest most innocent bundling would 
never come under scrutiny, but truly anticompetitive practices with substantial social costs could still be 
successfully pursued by the competition authorities.  
The competition policy procedure that we outline is conservative.  It excludes some potential cases of 
anticompetitive bundling from scrutiny, but only those for which it appears impossible to provide 
sufficient evidence for a case. Our safe haven rules ensure that most instances of bundling go 
undisturbed.  Even when an instance of bundling falls outside the safe haven provisions, the procedure 
we outline requires considerable theoretical and evidentiary work by the competition authority before 
intervention can be justified.   
Against this background of a conservative policy carefully derived from economic theory, we reject the 
suggestion made by some economists that justifying intervention against bundling necessarily requires a 
delicate assessment of the parameters of some specific economic model.  As we have shown in this 
paper, under certain identifiable circumstances, bundling can have serious anticompetitive effects via 
robust mechanisms that do not depend subtly on the parameters of a specific economic model.  We 
believe it is highly desirable to be cautious in designing competition policy towards bundling.  But this 
desire to be cautious cannot justify the adoption of an approach of “(modified) per-se legality”.   
We have also attempted to clarify how European Commission policy measures up to the policy outlined 
in this paper. We believe that in the recent case against Microsoft, the Commission has taken an 
approach consistent with that outlined in this paper. We see this in sharp contrast to earlier cases in 
which the Commission refused to specify a specific mechanism which would lead to anticompetitive 
effects of bundling and in which, as a result, the evidentiary test for anticompetitive effects remained 
unclear.  
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